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AD/NE 25X1

13 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: China Arms Control Conference

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1. [redacted] director of this ACDA-sponsored conference, invited me some time ago to be a participant. I demurred, but have received an okay from the Office of Security to attend any sessions of the conference I wish, in the capacity of observer. I sat in as such Friday evening, 10 July, for a session on the sources of Chinese Communist foreign policy conduct. The following are, briefly, my chief impressions.

2. The agenda is far too long. There simply is not this much to talk about, a view [redacted] and I gave [redacted] some months ago, apparently without effect. Several of the participants confided in me Friday evening that they felt everyone would be talked out after about three days, and that by 11 days of it they would be climbing the walls.

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3. The session Friday night was like my golf game: brilliant but erratic. The two principal speakers were Professors Robert North of Stanford and Franz Schurmann of Cal. North's remarks were fairly irrelevant, his chief point being that China would never go for arms control until and unless more stable states had been created around its periphery.

4. Schurmann raised several theses: (a) Peiping's goals are primarily internal; (b) there is a marked dichotomy between the simplistic written views of Mao and the subtle, complex, and rational view of the world contained in most of the Chinese polemics against Moscow; (c) the Chinese have got themselves into a real mess at present on the domestic scene; and (d) Schurmann holds that the leadership has rather shot its wad, that a moratorium on initiative is probable, and that we are not going to get any hard and fast agreements or commitments from the Chinese, concerning either the USA or the USSR, until the second-generation leadership has been established.

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5. During the discussion period several theories were offered as to just why the Chinese had decided to go for nuclear weapons. Among these theories were that the Chinese leaders felt that they must have such weapons in order to be modern, that they want a tactical nuclear capability for possible use chiefly against the USSR, and (to me, the best guess thus far) the Chinese desire may not be too different from that of the US Apollo effort (we know we don't really need this, but we're stuck with it, can't do without it, and don't know just why).

6. Alice Hsieh (RAND) told me there that she is anxious to do a fairly short study of Japanese defense attitudes, since, following a recent visit there, she suspects that the Japanese military have growing long-run uncertainty about US intentions in the Far East. She seems to feel that this will cause an acceleration both of Japanese weaponry and of pressures for normalization of relations with Mainland China. I encouraged her to have a go at such a study.

7. [] of OSI attended a session on Sunday, 12 July. I may go down once or twice this week, the schedule here permitting. A full transcript of the conference is being taken, and the Agency will receive copies when it is completed. In sum, I feel that the conference is a good idea, but that the USG will not get too much for its money.

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